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WINDOWS SECURITY

Hardening Wireless LAN Connections Part 1
By: McGraw-Hill/Osborne
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    2004-08-16

    Table of Contents:
  • Hardening Wireless LAN Connections Part 1
  • Preventing Rogue APs
  • Implementing WLAN Discovery Procedures
  • Detecting Unauthorized WAPs from the Wired Network
  • Hardening Wireless Access Points
  • Changing the Default Administrator Name and Password
  • Securely Configuring the Service Set Identifier (SSID)
  • Configuring Logging
  • Configuring NTP
  • Restricting Wireless Mode
  • Using MAC Address Filtering

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    Hardening Wireless LAN Connections Part 1 - Preventing Rogue APs


    (Page 2 of 11 )

    Preventing Rogue APs

    No good, bulletproof technical method exists to prevent a WAP from being connected to your network. By that I mean that if someone wants to bring a rogue AP onto your network, they are always going to have a chance of being successful. This doesn’t mean that you should pack up the tent and head home, however. There are a few things you can do to prevent or greatly reduce the odds of a rogue WAP being successfully connected to your network:

    • Implement a wireless security policy. The first thing to do is to have a good wireless security policy. The problem of unauthorized WAPs is largely a people problem that requires a people solution in the form of enforceable security policies. Also, your wireless security policy is one that absolutely must have teeth. If someone brings a rogue WAP online, they need to be subject to termination of employment. Your wireless security policy also needs to define what the response to a rogue AP is. For example, will the AP be confiscated, and, if so, who is responsible for that?
    • Provide for physical security. A WAP has a limited range. You should implement physical security measures that prevent someone from being able to get within range of a WAP running in your organization. Unfortunately, oftentimes this is not a practical measure, and it’s useless in regard to people with unauthorized WAPs (they already aren’t paying attention to the security policy, so they probably don’t care about where they locate their WAP).

    WLAN Modes of Operation and Components   Another aspect of your wireless security policy should define the mode of operation permitted for you WLANs. WLANs have two modes of operation. The first mode of operation is infrastructure mode, and it’s the conventional WLAN configuration. Infrastructure mode entails the wireless clients being connected to the existing wired infrastructure by way of a WAP or wireless router. The second mode of operation is ad hoc mode, sometimes referred to as peer-to-peer mode. In ad hoc mode, multiple wireless clients are connected to each other in a peer-to-peer fashion, allowing small workgroups of computers to connect to each other without any other infrastructure. You should not allow ad hoc connections in your environment.

    You also need to explicitly define the physical WLAN components you will allow in your network. This will assist you in detecting and identifying unauthorized wireless devices. The three primary WLAN components to define in your environment are the following:

    • Wireless access point (WAP) A WAP (sometimes referred to as a base station) is the device that wireless clients connect to. A WAP can typically connect hundreds of wireless clients and effectively operates like a bridge, allowing the client access to the physical LAN segment the WAP is connected to. WAPs are typically used in enterprise environments to provide wireless access.
    • Wireless router Wireless routers combine the functionality of a WAP with a router, allowing wireless clients to connect to the router and then be routed to other networks. Wireless routers often include firewall functionality and are typically used in small office/home office (SOHO) environments to provide wireless access.
    • Wireless client Wireless clients include any device that uses a wireless network card to communicate with a WAP or wireless router.

    • Provide a supported WLAN infrastructure. If people want a WLAN and they don’t have one, they might be tempted to implement one on their own. On the other hand, if you make sure you implement a WLAN that supports your users’ needs, they will be much less likely to decide to go about it on their own. The truth is, most rogue WLANs are implemented by nonmalicious users who simply think that a WLAN will make their lives easier.

    • Implement 802.1x port-based security on your switches. As we will discuss in Chapter 9, you should implement 802.1x port-based security to prevent any unauthorized connections to your network by requiring all connections to be authenticated. This includes preventing an unauthorized WAP from being able to connect.

    • Limit the number of MAC addresses per port to only one. This will prevent switches from passing packets from rogue WAPs because the WAP and the client both have different MAC addresses. This is also a good measure if you want to prevent the users from plugging in a “rogue” switch or hub as well. You can implement this on many IOS-based switches by running the following command at the CLI:

      switch02(config-if)# switchport port-security maximum

    Rogue WAPs   

    I personally know of companies that have rogue WAPs that allow anyone on the freeway to access their internal production network, including potentially granting access to source code. A rogue WAP is a death blow to security because no matter how much you have hardened the perimeter, it has been instantly undermined by the WAP once it connects to your internal network.


    Once you have undertaken procedures to prevent unauthorized WAPs, the next step is to implement procedures to detect unauthorized wireless connections.  

    This is from Hardening Network Infrastructure, by Wesely Noonan (McGraw-Hill/Osborne, ISBN 0072255021). Check it out at your favorite bookstore today. Buy this book now.

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